Governing pluralistic societies through democratic institutions represents a paradox that touches on the core of democratic theory: How can an electoral majority exercise legitimate power without it turning into the permanent domination of ethnic, religious, or sectarian groups?
This question takes on particular importance in societies divided along sectarian lines, where mechanisms of representation and deliberation risk becoming tools for “majority tyranny” rather than avenues for public self-governance. The theoretical answer rests on a crucial distinction between “political majorities” and “sectarian majorities,” which has profound implications for understanding democratic legitimacy and institutional design.
Political majorities arise from a voluntary union of citizens united around common goals and programs that transcend inherited affiliations such as race, religion, and tribe. These alliances crystallize through consultative processes in which voters evaluate competing platforms that address intersecting issues that affect everyone, regardless of sectarian identities. They are a shifting, temporal majority, capable of being reshaped by changing policy preferences and the emergence of new agendas. This creates a structural incentive for moderation, recognizing the instability of current alliances and their potential for future change. Conversely, sectarian majorities derive their cohesion from birth, not political choice; membership is inherited and often unchangeable. When political organization is reshaped along the same fundamental fault lines, electoral competition becomes more like zero-sum conflicts between fixed groups, and democracy’s promise of peaceful alternation becomes a demographic census of power.
This distinction illuminates questions of democratic legitimacy, which are not based on abstract numerical superiority, but rather on political equality, procedural justice, and the temporal limitations of power. While a political majority organized around intersecting public interests opens paths beyond sectarian rigidity, its successful formation depends on appropriate institutional arrangements, a supportive cultural structure, and a conscious political leadership. These conditions cannot be assumed to exist automatically in divided societies and those emerging from armed conflict.
Engineering Cross-Sectarian Political Alliances
The transition from sectarian competition to issue-based governance requires concrete theoretical mechanisms that enable diverse groups to identify common interests and work collectively to achieve them. The concept of “intersecting cleavages” is a cornerstone for understanding how political alliances transcend primary identities. When social cleavages intersect rather than overlap, individuals find themselves belonging to different formations depending on the issue at hand, creating a “moderating dynamic” essential for democratic stability. This dynamic generates effects that prevent the consolidation of permanent political majorities and minorities: today’s opponents on one issue may become tomorrow’s allies on another, altering the strategic calculations of political actors. At the same time, it creates internal diversity within sectarian groups that prevents them from mobilizing into homogeneous voting blocs.
The distinction between programmatic and ‘clientelistic’ politics represents a structural dimension in alliance engineering. Programmatic politics organizes competition around platforms that address public challenges through systematic reforms. By their very nature, they transcend sectarian boundaries, as they address issues that affect all citizens, regardless of their identities. These platforms require parties to build coalitions that span broader, narrower divisions to achieve electoral success. In contrast, ‘clientelistic’ politics distributes resources to specific groups or individuals in exchange for political support, reinforcing sectarian divisions by making identity the criterion for access to state resources. The transition from clientelism to programmatic politics represents a sign of maturity in democratic development, achieved gradually as citizens increasingly evaluate choices based on policy performance rather than sectarian loyalty.
Institutional mechanisms play a key role in enabling cross-sectarian alliances, and electoral systems in particular influence their dynamics. Proportional representation systems create strong incentives for coalition-building both before and after the election, as a single party rarely achieves an absolute majority, forcing parties into subsequent coalition negotiations. They also enable multi-partyism and effective competition between them, opening the way for programmatic forces focused on specific policy areas and limiting the zero-sum nature of competition. Decentralization provides a complementary institutional mechanism by creating multiple levels of coalition-forming, allowing groups considered minorities at the national level to achieve majorities in specific regions and reducing the risk of polarization at the national level.
Civil society organizations serve as bridges for communication and cooperation across sects, providing spaces for citizens to interact around shared interests outside the logic of electoral competition. These organizations create “weak ties” that transcend sectarian boundaries. Although less dense than family or ethnic ties, they prove essential for conveying information, building trust, and identifying common interests among diverse groups. The development of shared civic identities through civic engagement heralds a gradual, fundamental shift in political consciousness, as identities that transcend the categories associated with affiliation crystallize through repeated collaborative activities with individuals from other communities.
The Consensus Trap and Alternative Paths
Arend Lijphart’s theory of consensual democracy has emerged as an effective response to managing diversity through guaranteed power-sharing mechanisms. These mechanisms are based on four institutional pillars: grand coalitions that guarantee representation of major groups; mutual veto power that allows each group to block decisions affecting its vital interests; proportional representation in public office; and sectoral autonomy that enables groups to manage their internal affairs. This framework is compelling because of its promise to eliminate the existential risks of political competition by guaranteeing a share for each group regardless of electoral outcomes.
However, the consensual model contains inherent theoretical paradoxes that entrench the divisions it claims to manage. Institutionalizing group differences as the basis for representation prevents the crystallization of the intersecting political identities necessary for democratic development and creates incentives for political leaders to mobilize sectarian fears rather than formulate programmatic visions. Leaders remain in place not by virtue of effective governance, but rather as “guardians” of group interests.
The entrenchment of division is embodied through several paths: electoral laws that allocate seats according to sectarian quotas, thus hindering the emergence of cross-sectarian movements; the distribution of positions according to sectarian proportions, which weaves identity-based patronage networks; and systems of mutual veto that enable the politics of obstruction, enabling any group to paralyze the government in order to extract concessions.
Alternative frameworks suggest the possibility of designing democratic arrangements that transcend sectarian divisions without institutionalizing them. Approaches that manage religious diversity while maintaining state neutrality provide enabling conditions for equal political participation regardless of identity, with a focus on citizenship rather than sectarian affiliation. Their theoretical advantages include avoiding the incorporation of religious divisions into institutional structures, opening the way for programmatic competition, and nurturing national, rather than sectarian, political identities.
Majoritarian systems require constitutional controls and minority protection mechanisms to curb the tendencies of permanent exclusion of transient electoral majorities. For example, requiring a majority to initiate any constitutional amendments prevents fundamental rights from being altered by a simple majority and forces actors to build broader coalitions. Meanwhile, independent judicial review ensures effective oversight of majoritarian abuses by empowering courts to invalidate legislation that violates constitutional principles. Decentralized organization also distributes powers between the national and subnational levels, creating multiple arenas of competition capable of accommodating minority interests. Political norms (of tolerance, compromise, and respect for minority rights) are often more decisive than formal constraints, as they develop through historical accumulation and practice, which confirms the temporary nature of democratic majority power.
The Potential and Limits of Political Majorities in Pluralistic Societies
Analyzing political majorities as a tool for overcoming sectarian divisions reveals the combination of conceptual competence and practical complexity in constructing democratic governance within diverse societies. The distinction between a political majority arising from voluntary association and a sectarian majority defined by inherited characteristics establishes a fundamental framework for understanding the transition of democratic politics from identity-based competition to issue-based governance. This distinction also sheds light on the conditions of democratic legitimacy—political equality, procedural justice, and the temporal limitation of power—while recognizing the structural obstacles that complicate any linear vision of progress.
Building a political majority capable of crossing sectarian lines requires specific conditions: intersecting social structures that prevent the unification of divisions; programmatic parties that compete for common solutions; electoral systems that encourage broad coalitions; civil society organizations that build bridges of trust across divisions; and constitutional frameworks that protect minority rights while simultaneously enabling majority rule. Each of these conditions represents a necessity, but not a sufficient one, for inclusive democratic politics. The theoretical paradoxes of the consociational model demonstrate how arrangements that are supposed to manage diversity can actually entrench divisions, producing a process that resists change even as its imbalances become increasingly apparent.
The tension between decisiveness and inclusiveness is a constant challenge for democratic decision-making: majoritarianism promises decisive power but risks excluding minorities; consensus requirements protect minorities but can lead to paralysis; decentralization accommodates diversity but can enable the emergence of local authoritarianism. Every institutional arrangement entails trade-offs between competing democratic values, requiring sensitive calibration appropriate to the context.
Instead of General Prescriptions
The concept of political majorities remains central to contemporary democratic theory. The alternative to an inclusive political majority is neither spontaneous pluralistic harmony nor a stable balance, but rather the imposition of tyranny or a slide into sectarian conflict. Accordingly, the promise of political majorities “as the basis for democratic coexistence in irreversibly pluralistic societies” can only be realized by combining theoretical innovation with practical experimentation, while maintaining sufficient flexibility and adaptability in democratic systems to gradually move toward greater inclusiveness while preserving legitimate diversity.
