I show in this article that the question posed by the international crimes committed in Syria is not one of preferring one judicial forum over another, but one of the conditions for the transfer of jurisdiction from the European courts to the Syrian national judiciary, and of the role that Syria can currently play in the accountability process, regardless of the extradition of individuals.
Starting from the Syrian Ministry of the Interior’s statement in June 2026 welcoming the European investigators to collect evidence against the suspects from the Assad era, it becomes clear that the statement was not a formal request for extradition, but rather an invitation to cooperate in collecting evidence and to activate mutual legal assistance. Here, three main points stand out. First, that universal jurisdiction in Europe was not a preferred option, but rather a response to the closure of the international tracks, particularly because of the Russian-Chinese veto on referring the Syrian file to the International Criminal Court in 2014. Second, that extradition to Damascus currently collides with legal obstacles, the most prominent of which is the absence of a definition of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and command responsibility in the Syrian legislation, in addition to the problem of the death penalty, which, in light of the European obligations, precludes any transfer. Third, that the Syrian constitutional declaration issued in March 2025 establishes sound principles, however the legislative structure has not yet completed this path.
I conclude in this article that the European judicial proceedings should continue for the time being, and that the current Syrian role should center on facilitating access to the archives, the witnesses, and the crime scene. As for the optimal solution in the foreseeable term, it lies in establishing a hybrid judicial chamber that combines the Syrian national judiciary with international standards, along the lines of the experiences of Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Kosovo.
Fadel Abdulghany
The international crimes committed in Syria pose a problem that goes beyond the procedural question of where the trial is held. For when prosecutions are opened before European courts on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and then there emerges in post-Assad Syria a government that declares its readiness to cooperate in collecting evidence and to grant access to the documents, the witnesses, and the crime scene, the question here becomes one of the sequence of justice and its conditions: when are the national courts, which hold the natural jurisdiction, able to recover their role? And when does universal jurisdiction remain a temporary necessity imposed by the gap of institutions, the risks of extradition, and the rights of the victims and the accused together?
In this context, the statement of the spokesperson for the Ministry of the Interior in Syria, made to Sweden’s radio in early June 2026, should be understood, regarding the welcoming of the European investigators to enter Syria and collect evidence against those suspected of committing crimes in the Assad era, while granting access to the documents, the witnesses, the crime scene, and the security archives, which are largely preserved.
The value of the statement does not lie in the fact that it announced the transfer of the center of justice from Europe to Syria, but rather in that it revealed a more realistic and less confusing track: cooperation on evidence and mutual legal assistance before any discussion of the transfer of individuals. For the statement, in its announced form, was not a formal request for extradition, did not rest on a treaty-based mechanism, and did not ask Sweden to hand over suspects to Damascus.
Hence the question that should govern the debate is defined: should the trial of the officers of the former regime who are present in Europe continue before the European courts that hold jurisdiction over them and detain them in the first place, or should they be transferred to Syria to be tried before national institutions that are still in the process of being rebuilt?
Under the current circumstances, the answer most consistent with justice, the rights of the victims, and the guarantees of a fair trial lies in the principal prosecutions remaining in Europe, and in the Syrian role with respect to these trials being focused on making evidence available, securing the archives, and facilitating access to the witnesses and the crime sites, not on requesting the transfer of the accused.
Europe did not become an arena for accountability over the crimes in Syria by way of preference, but because the ordinary international tracks were closed. For Syria is not a party to the Rome Statute, and the road to the International Criminal Court passed through the Security Council, where the 2014 referral project faced a Russian and Chinese veto. Universal jurisdiction in the European courts, which is applied to the core crimes regardless of the place of their occurrence, filled the vacuum left behind by a disabled system.
This alternative has produced an existing record, for the European courts convict or acquit according to whether the evidence meets the required threshold. They produce reasoned judgments, guarantee the rights of the defense, impose enforceable penalties, and establish a public record that would not have existed without them, and they represent today the most developed accountability structures available for the crimes that were committed in Syria.
Against this record, the legal argument for extradition to Damascus is, at the present time, almost ruled out. For the governing rule is non-refoulement; extradition also usually requires double criminality, however the Syrian legislation does not define crimes against humanity, nor war crimes, nor command responsibility, which leaves the categories in question uncertain in the Syrian law. The charges now being tried in Damascus also carry the death penalty, a penalty to which no European state bound by the relevant protocols may expose a transferred person in the absence of binding guarantees.
As for the deeper obstacle, it is the incompleteness of the Syrian framework itself. For the constitutional declaration issued in March 2025 binds the judiciary to independence, prohibits the exceptional courts, and excludes the core crimes from the protection of non-retroactivity, thereby recognizing the need for accountability.
But the legal structure has not yet caught up with that. For the penal code does not adequately define war crimes, or crimes against humanity, or genocide, or enforced disappearance; the definition of torture remains below the international standard; and command responsibility is absent, which is the doctrine necessary to reach the senior officials who did not commit the acts personally.
And although proximity to the victims is a real value, and a credible Syrian trial would allow the survivors to confront the official denial, to reach the archives, and to see the judgment issued where the crimes took place; nevertheless the European proceedings should continue.
The immediate Syrian role should pass through: the preserved archives, the crime scene and the sites of the mass graves, facilitating access to the witnesses, and formal mutual legal assistance, none of which involves the legal risk represented by the transfer of individuals. As for extradition, it belongs to a later stage, and becomes available on a case-by-case basis only after Syria enacts legislation for the international crimes, fortifies its judiciary, builds mechanisms for the protection of witnesses, removes the death penalty from these proceedings, and opens its detention sites to independent monitoring.
And between the distant European court and the unready national court, the hybrid chamber provides the optimal solution as a bridge that links the national judiciary with international standards; for the precedents of Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Kosovo show that the mixed Syrian and international composition, under a codified law protected from executive control, can combine national proximity with international standards.
