Over the weekend, Syria’s kaleidoscope of conflict threw up another curveball.
For the first time in a long time, Syrians witnessed a qualitative shift in fighting — the success of the rebel advance, in cooperation with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, surprised us all. In less than a week, the opposition has made significant territorial gains, including full control over the city of Aleppo, its military airports, and the entire Idlib Governorate. Opposition forces have also reached the town of Suran, south of Hama’s outskirts.
This is an unprecedented development for Syrians who have monitored the war since 2011 — this weekend’s events caps off the largest territorial shift since the Moscow agreement in 2020.
The rebel opposition has cut off the Assad regime’s main supply lines, most notably the M5 highway, which could open the door to further advances in areas under the regime’s control.
Put simply, the rapid offensive reflects a set of common, synergistic factors: the result of the increasing organisation and capabilities of the rebels on the one hand and the decline in support for the Syrian regime from its traditional allies on the other.
The decline of Assad’s key guarantors has been especially tangible. Since it invaded Ukraine in 2022, Russia has realigned its priorities away from Syria, leaving a clear vacuum.
Russian forces now operate at their lowest levels since 2016. Reports even indicate that the Hmeimim air base — part of Russia’s permanent military contingent in Syria — now operates with less than ten aircraft, with air defence systems and personnel withdrawn to support operations in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Assad’s other regional ally, Iran, is facing mounting crises on several fronts. Persistent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian installations in Syria have greatly reduced its ability to support Assad’s forces, while Hezbollah, one of Iran’s most prominent allies in Syria, is currently suffering an existential crisis, reducing its ability to directly influence the Syrian battlefield.
But this isn’t the full picture. Analyses so far have missed out on the growing competence and capabilities of the armed opposition, which has transformed from scattered and disorganised groups into a relatively efficient force.
This has been accomplished due to two main factors: first, forces are now operating under a unified command through the oversight of a joint operations room. Second, they have effectively utilized long-range drones and portable anti-aircraft missiles, both of which have succeeded in neutralising the regime’s air superiority and paralysing the movement of helicopters.
The elephant in the room
But amid this theatre of war, one actor seems to be most in control: Turkey. The recent rebel advance reflects the increasingly important role that Turkey is playing in shaping the military and political landscape.
Ankara has adopted a multi-layered strategy to achieve its goals. This strategy relies on providing indirect support to the Syrian opposition, with three main objectives.
First, Turkey seeks to weaken its regional rivals, most notably the Syrian regime and Kurdish forces, which it sees as a direct threat to its influence and national security. Recent attempts to normalise relations with the regime faltered as a result of Assad’s rejection of Turkish demands, with the offensive used as a means of pressuring the Syrian regime. However, Turkey must manage these moves to avoid escalating tensions with Russia, which remains a strategic partner for Ankara at regional and international levels.
Second, Turkey wants to enhance its control over northern Syria, particularly in the Kurdish-run areas of northeast Syria, long considered a threat by Ankara.
Third, Turkey hopes to address the issue of Syrian refugees, which represents a growing internal challenge, by working to establish “safe zones” that will pave the way for the gradual return of Syrian refugees to their lands.
In short, Turkey has forced Assad’s hand. And in response, the Syrian regime has adopted a series of countermeasures, including troop build-ups and its usual weapon of choice: airstrikes.
However, these measures appear limited in their effectiveness. The regime’s deep structural deterioration — coupled with a collapse of troop morale — has made Assad even more vulnerable to mounting threats.
Under these circumstances, Assad is expected to rely on what he knows best: violent, indiscriminate retribution.
Remember, the Syrian regime’s raison d’etre is survival at any cost, even if it requires fighting inside Damascus itself.
Assad will always reject any form of political transition, insisting that his continued rule is the main priority, regardless of enduring damage to the country and people.
Once again, it is the Syrian people who bear the ultimate cost of Assad’s psychopathic stubbornness.
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, some 48,500 have been displaced, with aid organisations struggling to provide them with assistance.
Furthermore, from November 27 and December 3, my organisation, the Syrian Network for Human Rights, documented the number of civilian casualties. One hundred forty-nine civilians have been killed, including 35 children and 16 women. Of the 149, the Assad regime was responsible for 105 of the civilians, including 33 children and 16 women.
Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces have killed 27 civilians, while Russian forces have killed eight civilians, including two children and two women.
Armed opposition factions also committed murder, causing the death of five civilians, including one woman, while reports indicate that a further four have been killed by other parties.
What lies ahead for Syria?
Despite the recent military advances made by the Syrian opposition, the governance of newly liberated areas has become a challenge of a different kind.
The success of the opposition at this stage is not limited to military achievements but depends largely on its ability to provide fair and sustainable governance in the areas under its control.
The political and military dominance of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib, characterised by its jihadist origins and authoritarian leadership style, raises serious concerns among civilians.
Despite the group’s attempts to present itself as an organised and pragmatic force, increasing reports of abuses, including arbitrary arrests and the suppression of political dissent, reinforce doubts about its ability to gain the trust of the population and achieve good governance.
In addition to political concerns, the opposition faces enormous administrative challenges, especially in running large cities like Aleppo. The lack of administrative expertise could make it difficult to maintain security, distribute resources fairly, and gain the loyalty of local populations. The presence of diverse factions within the opposition’s joint operations room also portends potential internal conflicts, as the backgrounds and goals of these factions vary, potentially sparking disputes over control of resources and liberated areas.
Administrative and human rights challenges in opposition-held areas make military successes vulnerable to erosion, especially if underlying issues are not addressed.
Without respect for human rights, accountability for abuses, fostering unity among factions, and establishing an independent civilian government capable of delivering basic services, military gains will remain temporary victories that could turn into new hotbeds of chaos and instability.
Recent events in Syria confirm that the essence of the crisis lies in the continued rule of the Assad family since 1970 with repressive policies based on iron and fire, in addition to the absence of any real political transition process.
The solution to the Syrian crisis cannot be achieved without serious international intervention that forces all parties to sit at the negotiating table.
The international community is required to play a more effective role in ending the conflict and forcing the warring parties to make concessions leading to a comprehensive settlement. Without such intervention, Syria will remain trapped in a vicious cycle of wars and conflicts, the price of which will always be paid by the Syrian citizen.
