Introduction
As the popular uprising in Syria, which first started in March 2011 as peaceful protests, devolved into an internal armed conflict by the first quarter of 2012, hundreds of armed opposition factions had already come into existence. Over time, these factions grew in both number and variety, creating a complex security landscape marked by the widespread presence of non-state armed actors. Despite the protracted nature of the conflict, a political solution still seems to be an inescapable necessity to achieve sustainable stability in the country. One of the key challenges facing any political transition process in Syria is the reintegration of these factions into a new national army or regular forces.
The success or failure of this reintegration process will have direct implications for the long-term stability and security of the country. To fail in effectively addressing this challenge may entrench division, undermine the legitimacy of the new government, and possibly reignite conflict. By the same token, a well-planned and thoughtful reintegration process could contribute to achieving sustainable peace and fostering national reconciliation, reflecting positively on the country’s stability and security.
While existing literature addresses the challenges of reintegrating non-governmental armed groups in post-conflict contexts, there is a scarcity of research that specifically focuses on the Syrian context and the unique dynamics of its conflict. This study is an attempt to address this gap by providing an analysis that specifically focuses on the military and political landscape in Syria since 2011.
What are the primary challenges and potential impacts of reintegrating armed forces in post-political transition Syria? And how might this process affect Syria’s long-term stability and security? In answering this question, the paper: (1) analyses the legal, operational, and political obstacles that may face the process of reintegrating the various armed factions into a unified military structure; (2) assesses the impact that may arise from the potential success or failure of said reintegration process on Syria’s security and political stability; (3) gives practical recommendations based on the analysis of obstacles to facilitate the reintegration process and enhance Syria’s stability.
The paper incorporates a hybrid theorical approach, combining concepts such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), conflict resolution and peacebuilding theories. It also includes various interviews with representatives and members of armed opposition factions/Syrian National Army (SNA). Field data is combined with theoretical frameworks to provide a deeper understanding of the challenges facing the reintegration process, then offer actionable recommendations.
However, the study faces some limitations, including difficulty accessing some non-state armed groups, such as Iranian militias, pro-Syrian regime militias, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), or Jabhat al-Nusra and methodological constraints related to the scarcity of accurate data and references concerning the Syrian landscape.
In light of these limitations, the scope of the paper is confined to armed opposition factions which currently exist outside the framework of the Syrian state, while assuming the existence of similar resemblances between this paper’s chief case study and other non-state actors. These limitations notwithstanding, this paper contributes to enhancing understanding of the challenges related to integrating armed factions into the Syrian national army. Its findings and recommendations provide a crucial foundation for further dialogue and political development in this complex context. Future studies can expand beyond these limitations and contribute to enhancing the policies followed.
