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Israel’s Recognition of “Somaliland” Contradicts International Law

12 January 2026
Israel’s Recognition of “Somaliland” Contradicts International Law

HARGEISA, SOMALIALAND - JANUARY 6: (----EDITORIAL USE ONLY - MANDATORY CREDIT - 'ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY / HANDOUT' - NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS - DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS----) Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar meets with Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, in Hargeisa, Somaliland on January 6, 2026. (Photo by Israeli Foreign Ministry/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Fadel Abdelghany  

On December 26, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced Israel’s recognition of the “Republic of Somaliland” as a sovereign and independent state, the first such recognition since Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. This unprecedented diplomatic move sparked widespread international condemnation and raised questions about its consistency with established principles of international law. This recognition directly challenges the rules governing the recognition of states, the principle of territorial integrity, the principle of non-intervention, and the obligation not to recognize illegal situations. An examination of these rules reveals a clear tension between the political discretion exercised by states in granting recognition and the legal constraints imposed on this discretion by international law. Furthermore, the explicit rejection of Israeli recognition by the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and numerous other states confirms that the majority of the international community views this action as incompatible with the normative foundations of the post-1945 international legal order.

 

The Theoretical Framework for State Recognition 

International law addresses the issue of state recognition through two distinct theoretical approaches: constitutive and declaratory. The constitutive theory, rooted in 19th-century legal positivism, holds that a state acquires international legal existence only through recognition by other states, and that recognition is a prerequisite for the establishment of international legal personality. In contrast, the declaratory theory, which has prevailed in contemporary jurisprudence and practice, posits that a state comes into being when it fulfills objective criteria, regardless of the recognition it receives from other states.

In this context, the criteria set forth in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States are recalled. This article identifies four elements of a state: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to conduct relations with other states. Article 3 of the Convention further emphasizes that a state’s political existence is independent of its recognition by other states, thus reinforcing the declarative approach.

Recognizing a breakaway region is not merely a political decision, but a test of the limits of international law when it clashes with deals and interests.

While a declarative approach theoretically downplays the role of recognition in state-building, recognition remains a sovereign political act with significant legal implications. States enjoy considerable discretion in granting recognition, and strategic, economic, and political considerations often intertwine in this decision, extending beyond purely legal assessments.

However, this power is not unlimited; recognition must be exercised within the framework of international law, and it must not be turned into a tool to legitimize situations that have arisen or are maintaining themselves through the violation of fundamental rules. In this context, the concept of “premature recognition”—that is, recognizing an entity that has not yet demonstrated statehood according to international legal standards—is raised as a practice subject to widespread legal criticism. While there is no complete consensus on the legal nature of recognition, a significant body of scholarly agreement considers premature recognition a violation of international law.

 

Territorial Integrity and Non-Intervention 

The principle of territorial integrity has been a cornerstone of the post-1945 international legal order. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. This principle has been reaffirmed in subsequent instruments, most notably the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, which is widely regarded as a set of binding customary rules.

The International Court of Justice has affirmed in its jurisprudence that territorial integrity operates primarily within the context of relations between states. In its 2010 advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Court clarified that the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is limited to relations between states. This interpretation implies that the primary restriction applies to external interference in the unity of states, not to internal political processes as such. Nevertheless, this principle remains highly relevant to issues of recognition, particularly in cases of unilateral secession without the consent of the parent state and without a recognized negotiated or constitutional framework.

The territorial integrity of Somalia has been repeatedly recognized and affirmed by the international community since its independence. The 1991 declaration of independence by “Somaliland” was a unilateral act, made without the consent of the central government and outside the framework of an internationally recognized constitution. Furthermore, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the principles established by the 1964 Cairo Summit emphasize respect for the borders inherited from the colonial era, based on the principle of “status quo,” and the preservation of the territorial integrity of African states. In this context, the African Union explicitly rejected Israeli recognition, warning that any infringement upon Somalia’s unity could set a dangerous precedent with far-reaching consequences for peace and stability on the continent.

The principle of non-intervention is closely linked to territorial integrity; it prohibits states from interfering in matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of other states. The Declaration on Friendly Relations articulated this principle unequivocally, stating that no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The Declaration specifically prohibited armed intervention and all other forms of intervention or threats against the person of a state or its political, economic, and cultural elements.

The International Court of Justice, in its 1986 ruling in the case of Nicaragua v. United States, stated that prohibited intervention is based on the element of coercion directed at matters which, by virtue of its sovereignty, the State may freely decide, including the choice of its political, economic, social and cultural system, thereby depriving the targeted State of control over the matter in question.

Within this framework, Israel’s recognition of the “Republic of Somaliland” can be characterized as an illegitimate interference in Somalia’s internal affairs for several reasons: it touches upon a fundamental issue falling within the Somali state’s internal jurisdiction, namely its territorial structure and unity; and it provides political and diplomatic support to a separatist entity’s claim to legitimacy, contradicting the declared position of the central government in Mogadishu. This characterization is further reinforced by the fact that the recognition occurred without Somalia’s consent and in direct contradiction to its repeated affirmations of its territorial integrity.

The strength of the post-1945 international system rested on curbing the disintegration of states by force or political manipulation, not on encouraging unilateral secession.

 

The Duty of Non-Recognition and Peremptory Norms 

Contemporary international law recognizes the duty of non-recognition of situations arising from grave breaches of peremptory norms. Article 41(2) of the International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts stipulates that no state may recognize the legitimacy of a situation arising from a grave breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm, nor may it provide aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. Peremptory norms, in principle, include the prohibition of the use of force, the right of peoples to self-determination, and fundamental human rights obligations.

The International Court of Justice has applied the principle of non-recognition in numerous contexts. In its 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia, the Court held that South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia was illegal and that UN member states were obligated not to recognize the legitimacy of that presence. Similarly, in its 2004 advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, the Court concluded that all states had an obligation not to recognize the resulting illegal situation.

While the unilateral declaration of independence by the “Republic of Somaliland” does not, in itself, constitute a direct violation of a peremptory norm, the broader question is whether the recognition of the territory’s independence by a third state, unilaterally and in the face of widespread international and regional objections, effectively undermines the legal framework designed to protect territorial integrity and weakens the normative constraints intended to deter unilateral secession.

The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, described Israel’s recognition of the “Republic of Somaliland” as a blatant violation of international law and an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. He warned that unilateral recognitions constitute unacceptable interference in Somalia’s internal affairs and set a dangerous precedent that threatens regional and international security and stability. A joint statement issued by 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states also condemned this recognition, considering it a flagrant disregard for international law.

 

Self-Determination, Remedial Secession, and the Strategic Context 

The right to self-determination is a fundamental principle of international law, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and affirmed in Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This right affirms that peoples have the right to freely determine their political status and to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. However, the scope of self-determination outside the colonial context remains a subject of debate.

Here, the precautionary text contained in the Declaration on Friendly Relations is invoked, which states that self-determination shall not be interpreted as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismantle or weaken the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states, which conduct their activities in accordance with the principle of equal rights and the right of peoples to self-determination.

The concept of “remedial separation,” which posits the possibility of separation when a people is subjected to grave violations and denied genuine internal self-determination, has received limited support in some literature and official statements, particularly in the context of Kosovo. However, the International Court of Justice did not recognize remedial separation as a settled principle of international law in its 2010 advisory opinion on Kosovo.

Somaliland’s claim to independence is based, in part, on historical grievances, including alleged human rights abuses committed by the Somali government under Siad Barre, particularly the 1988 bombing of Hargeisa. However, the international community has not adopted this argument in a way that leads to recognition, and no specialized international body has ruled that Somaliland has a right to remedial secession. Crucially, even if remedial secession were considered a potential justification for independence, its implementation, where accepted, requires a multilateral assessment within international processes, not a unilateral decision by a single state.

Recognition driven by considerations of the Red Sea and the Abraham Accords does not exempt its holder from fundamental legal constraints.

Israel’s recognition of the “Republic of Somaliland” cannot be separated from its broader strategic context. Israeli officials framed this recognition within the context of the Abraham Accords, hoping it would offer (from their perspective) potential strategic advantages, including access to a vital location along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, expanded diplomatic influence in Africa amid growing international isolation, and the establishment of a precedent for recognizing entities willing to normalize relations with Israel. However, the discretionary nature of recognition does not absolve states of legal constraints. If recognition is premature or not based on sound legal grounds, and is actively reinforced by the state in a way that infringes upon the rights of another state, it may amount to an internationally wrongful act, thus entailing state responsibility.

 

Conclusion

International law provides a normative framework for assessing Israel’s recognition of the “Republic of Somaliland,” and from several perspectives, it is clear that this recognition contravenes fundamental legal principles. It raises a serious issue of territorial integrity by legitimizing a unilateral secession from Somalia without the consent of the central government in Mogadishu, contradicting a broad international and regional trend affirming the unity of Somalia. Furthermore, it can be considered an illegitimate interference in Somalia’s internal affairs by providing political and diplomatic support to a separatist entity on a matter related to the constitutional and territorial structure of the state. This is also linked to the problem of premature recognition, which is granted in isolation from established international practices, thus infringing upon Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, this action contravenes the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, which prohibits the encouragement or support of separatist activities aimed at undermining the unity of sovereign states.

Although recognition is often described as a discretionary political act, this discretion is not absolute. Recognition must be exercised in accordance with international law and must not become a means of undermining the fundamental principles upon which the international order rests. The widespread international rejection of Israeli recognition reflects an assessment that this action violates core principles such as territorial integrity and non-intervention. Furthermore, the stated strategic motives, including considerations related to the Red Sea, the Abraham Accords, and confronting regional rivals, do not (from the perspective of international law) justify a course of action that threatens or undermines these principles. Ultimately, the international community has a collective interest in preserving territorial integrity and non-intervention, and the unilateral recognition of the “Republic of Somaliland” raises serious concerns as it sets a precedent that could be exploited to undermine these rules in other cases.

Source: Originally published on The New Arab website (in Arabic)
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Fadel Abdul Ghany

Fadel Abdulghany

Founder and Head of the Syrian Network for Human Rights from June 2011 to date.

Master’s in International Law (LLM)/ De Montfort University/ Leicester, UK (March 2020).

Bachelorette in Civil Engineering /Projects Management / Damascus University.

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  • Child Recruitment in SDF-Controlled Areas: Legal Framework and Documented Practices
  • Israel’s Recognition of “Somaliland” Contradicts International Law
  • Currency Reform in Post-Assad Syria: Symbolic Legitimacy and the Path to Transitional Justice

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