Fadel Abdulghany
Following a large-scale joint US-Israeli military operation against Iran on February 28, which resulted in the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the destruction of significant portions of Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure in several provinces, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard launched a broad retaliatory campaign targeting not only Israel but also, and more significantly, the territories of the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. For the first time, all member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council were subjected to a simultaneous armed attack from a single source within a 24-hour period.
The February 28 operation was not authorized by the Security Council, and neither the United States nor Israel provided evidence of an armed attack on their territory or citizens that would justify resorting to self-defense. Most importantly, the strikes were carried out while Omani-mediated negotiations were underway, during which Iran had declared its willingness to abandon the development of materials suitable for nuclear weapons.
In principle, Iran has the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, provided that its response complies with international law. Iran has launched hundreds of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at US military installations located on the territory of sovereign states that were not party to the attack on Iran. The Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jassem Al-Budaiwi, affirmed that the GCC states have repeatedly made it clear to Tehran, in various meetings and on different occasions, that they will not permit the use of their territories or airspace for any military operations against the Islamic Republic. The question of whether a state hosting foreign military bases becomes a legitimate target simply because those bases are used in operations against a third state remains one of the most contentious issues in contemporary legal literature on the law of the use of force and the law of armed conflict. However, the prevailing view, based on the principle of sovereign equality and the prohibition of the use of force, tends to hold that the mere presence of foreign military installations does not make the host state a party to the war, particularly if the host state has not authorized or actively facilitated the military operations in question.
Iran’s sweeping characterization of all US bases in the region as legitimate targets erases this legal distinction and effectively treats host countries as extensions of US military power, thereby undermining their sovereignty as guaranteed by international law. The Gulf Cooperation Council, through Bahrain’s ambassador to the Security Council, categorically rejected this logic, holding Iran fully responsible for the attacks and asserting that no justification or arbitrary interpretation of international law can legitimize such behavior.
Even when a state has a legal basis for using force, international humanitarian law imposes strict limitations on how hostilities are conducted. In the Gulf states, at least four people were killed and more than 100 injured, and civilian airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait were damaged. Residential buildings in Bahrain were directly targeted, a drone struck homes in Duqm, Oman, and the Burj Al Arab in Dubai caught fire from interceptor missile debris. Vital commercial infrastructure, including the Jebel Ali port in Dubai, was also bombed. In Bahrain, the Interior Ministry evacuated residents from the Juffair district after thick smoke billowed from the vicinity of the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters, located within a densely populated residential area.
Iran’s targeting of the Gulf states reflects a calculation based on exporting the conflict rather than passively absorbing the blows. From Tehran’s perspective, if the regime’s survival is at stake, the incentive to contain the confrontation geographically diminishes considerably. Expanding the theater of operations raises the cost for US partners and sends a message that any attempt to dismantle the Iranian regime will have widespread repercussions across the region.
Likewise, the speed of the Iranian response, which occurred within about four hours of the initial strikes, suggests prior preparation and coordination, indicating that despite the decline in Iranian capabilities during the confrontation in June 2025, Iran retained a considerable ability to carry out missile strikes and use drones. Moreover, the disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 13 million barrels of crude oil pass daily, has posed a direct threat to the global energy supply chain. Some ships have been attacked, oil tanker traffic has been halted, oil prices have risen by about 10%, and airspace has been closed in at least eight countries. Whether this crisis will become a turning point toward de-escalation or a gateway to a wider regional war depends on choices that remain uncertain.
