Fadel Abdulghany
In Beirut, a Syrian-Lebanese agreement was signed today regarding the transfer of convicted individuals from Lebanese prisons to Syria to complete their sentences. As officially announced at a press conference held by the Lebanese Prime Minister and the Syrian Minister of Justice: “The agreement is not presented as a path to automatic release, but rather as a mechanism for transferring prisoners to serve their sentences, meaning the transfer of the convicted person from the country of issuance of the sentence to their country of nationality to complete their sentence there.”
The agreement is based on a procedural concept in international judicial cooperation: the transfer of sentence execution after a final judgment. Initially, it is reported that it will encompass approximately 300 Syrian convicts, with a focus on those who have served ten years or more in Lebanese prisons. The Lebanese proposal suggests that the transfer will follow an administrative-judicial process, beginning with a written request from the individual concerned through their legal representative. This will be followed by obtaining the necessary approvals and coordinating the transfer, either within the prison or at the border, within a timeframe that could reach approximately three months, depending on the pace of processing.
In parallel, an intention was announced to sign a subsequent agreement addressing the cases of Syrian detainees not covered by the agreement for those convicted—that is, those who have not been convicted or are awaiting trial. This implicitly acknowledges that the issue is divided into two tracks, differing in nature and complexity.
The agreement is presented in Lebanon as a mechanism to alleviate prison overcrowding, a legitimate administrative objective. It could also effectively mitigate some of the effects of consular isolation or the lack of social and legal support for convicts, provided it is accompanied by clear guarantees. Politically, the agreement also reflects the shift in relations between Beirut and Damascus toward what could be termed a functional normalization following the fall of Assad: cooperation on a specific issue, subject to procedural controls, and accompanied by rhetoric promising a more equal and respectful relationship. While the move may appear positive in form, as it opens a path forward, it will only be considered a success in substance to the extent that it is surrounded by verifiable legal guarantees and transparency that prevents the issue from being politicized rather than addressed as a matter of criminal justice and human rights.
Two tracks within the prisoners’ file: Convicted and detained without sentences
In practice, we are faced with two separate tracks:
- The first track: Those convicted with final sentences:
This category is clearly defined in law and can be implemented relatively easily because the authority to enforce it is established: a final judgment and the execution of a sentence. Therefore, enforcement begins with it as a swift step to produce a tangible effect.
- The second track: Those detained without charge (under investigation or trial):
Herein lies the crux of the problem: prolonged detention without swift judicial proceedings. This is not merely a Syrian issue, but one that touches the very structure of the Lebanese criminal justice system. Therefore, transferring convicts will not resolve the problem, because the root cause is the slow pace of procedures in Lebanon and the accumulation of detainees held without trial, along with the ensuing issues concerning the legality and continuation of their detention.
Announcing a subsequent agreement that addresses this category is an official acknowledgment that the two tracks cannot be integrated into a single instrument, but it raises a pivotal question: Will fragmentation be a prelude to a comprehensive solution or merely a phased management of the crisis?
The division of the case can be justified by the pragmatic considerations of administrative necessity: starting with those already convicted yields a quick result, alleviates prison overcrowding, and establishes a channel for cooperation. However, the danger lies in this division becoming a delaying tactic, leaving the cases of those not yet convicted indefinitely postponed without a clear timetable or criteria. In this scenario, the division becomes a means of defusing political pressure rather than resolving the legal issue.
The Lebanese Political Environment: A Bargaining Chip or a Structural Obstacle?
The Lebanese political environment, particularly Hezbollah’s negative relationship with post-Assad Syria, makes the issue of prisoners a potential bargaining chip both domestically and regionally. This may also partially explain why the issue is being fragmented, with the easiest cases being addressed first. When criminal justice is managed through political bargaining, the principle of justice is superseded by the principle of the deal, and the risk of violations increases, especially for those not yet convicted. Therefore, even if this factor is absent from official texts, it is present in the implementation conditions and necessitates strengthening the agreement with legal procedures that prevent politicization and regulate discretionary power.
If the reported implementation period is approximately three months, there are indicators of progress that should be monitored:
- Publication of the text of the agreement or a sufficient official summary clarifying eligibility criteria, exceptions, the meaning of “completion of sentence,” and follow-up arrangements.
- Announcement of a written rights guarantee mechanism that includes the right to appeal, individual risk assessment, and post-transfer monitoring mechanisms.
- Launching a process for those not convicted with a clear timetable and specific criteria and addressing the phenomenon of prolonged detention without trial as a systemic issue, not an exception.
- Monitoring any indications of payments linked to political or security developments, as these could signal the infiltration of a bargaining logic into the core of the implementation process.
The prisoner transfer agreement between Syria and Lebanon could be a practical way to alleviate prison overcrowding and regulate the execution of sentences through a clear channel of judicial cooperation, but it only acquires its full legal significance if it is accompanied by transparent and verifiable guarantees. The success of this process is measured by the integrity of the procedures, the protection of individual rights before, during, and after the transfer, and the ability to insulate the execution of the transfer from the logic of political bargaining. Most importantly, the fragmentation of the file should not become an excuse to postpone the heavier issue, namely those detained without sentences, because any treatment that does not put an end to the long detention, speed up trial processes, and subject detention to the standards of necessity and proportionality will keep the crisis in place, even if its face changes. From here, the real test in the coming months is to move from a speech of intent to published standards, specific paths, and declared responsibilities, thus transforming the agreement from a procedural step into a criminal justice policy that respects human rights and responds to the structural requirements that the file has revealed for years.
