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A Verdict with No Public Record

Syria’s First Domestic Trials of Senior Assad-Era Figures

19 November 2026
A Verdict with No Public Record

Fadel Abdulghany

In August 2026, a Damascus court sentenced Bashar al-Assad to death in absentia, but it has yet to publish its reasoned judgment. The trials of senior Assad-era figures are the most important criminal proceedings in Syria’s modern history. Their significance does not shield them from scrutiny. I argue that serious shortcomings in their legal and procedural foundations prevent anyone from properly assessing their outcomes. I examine four areas: the legal basis of the convictions, the integrity of the proceedings, trials in absentia, and the death sentences. Across all four, one concern dominates: the Court announced its legal conclusions without publishing the material anyone, in Syria or abroad, would need to test them.

Between August 11 and 24, the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus issued the first Syrian judgments against senior figures of the ousted Assad government. In Case No. 1 of 2026, it convicted one defendant in person – Atef Najib, former head of Daraa’s Political Security Branch – and seven in absentia, among them the former president himself, his brother Maher al-Assad, and former Defense Minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij. The Court sentenced all eight to death. It imposed the same penalty on Wassim al-Assad on August 18 and life imprisonment on the former Grand Mufti, Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun, on August 24. All sentences remain open to appeal before the Court of Cassation, though not by the absent defendants.

What Do the Damascus Rulings Achieve?

The legal achievement is real but limited. In its oral ruling of August 11, the Court held three things: Syrian courts have jurisdiction over international crimes committed on Syrian territory, immunity does not protect a former head of state, and neither statutes of limitation nor amnesties bar prosecution of the crimes before it. It also ordered the convicted defendants, jointly and severally, to compensate the admitted civil parties. According to the official account, it preserved later claims by other victims and the families of the missing.

The institutional value lies elsewhere: for the first time, Syria’s own courts have determined criminal responsibility for Assad-era crimes. Until then, such trials had taken place only abroad, under universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction in Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United States. The UN’s International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism and the Commission of Inquiry on Syria collected and analyzed evidence without determining criminal responsibility. A national conviction makes Syria’s judiciary a partner, not merely a source of evidence, for foreign prosecutors and international mechanisms.

The symbolic value invites overstatement. For more than fifty years, the presidency stood above the law. Read out on state television before victims in the courtroom, a sentence against the former president affirms that the office is subject to judicial authority. That principle matters to millions of Syrians, even if no one ever enforces the sentence. But symbolism cannot substitute for scrutiny of the legal and procedural questions the sentence raises.

The trials may also curb incentives for revenge, a function that calls for particular caution. Criminal justice assigns guilt to individuals for proven conduct, not to groups defined by identity or presumed loyalty. By individualizing guilt, it spares communities collective blame and removes a pretext for collective revenge. However, selective prosecution can defeat this purpose: accountability confined to one side, without clear criteria, invites the charge of victor’s justice, a real danger in Syria. So far, the Court has tried only cases concerning the former regime’s crimes. No national proceedings have yet addressed violations committed before December 2024 by other parties to the conflict, including armed opposition groups and the Islamic State.

Convictions for Uncodified International Crimes

Syria’s 1949 Penal Code defines neither crimes against humanity nor war crimes, and it leaves command responsibility and indirect perpetration unregulated. The Court nonetheless based the convictions on national provisions criminalizing the underlying acts: the 2022 Anti-Torture Law and the Penal Code articles on killing, deprivation of liberty, and incitement. Yet it also characterized these acts as crimes against humanity as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, to which Syria is not a party. To bring that definition into Syrian law, the Court relied on Article 12(2) of the Constitutional Declaration of March 13, 2025 (Declaration). Article 12(2) incorporates the rights and freedoms in human rights treaties ratified by Syria, not the treaties in their entirety.

The Court’s approach raises two often-conflated questions. The first asks whether the prosecution violates the legality principle under international law. Not necessarily. Syria acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1969, and its Article 15 permits prosecution for conduct criminal under international law when committed.

The second, national question is harder. Syrian law also enshrines the legality principle. Article 17(1) of the Declaration provides that there is no crime or punishment without law, Article 1 Penal Code bars punishing conduct not criminalized when committed, and Article 6 any penalty not then prescribed. Article 49(2) of the Declaration, however, exempts war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and all crimes committed by the former regime from the principle of non-retroactivity. Does Article 12(2) of the Declaration allow a Syrian judge to apply an international crime the legislature never enacted, defined by a treaty Syria has not joined? No published ruling has addressed the question. In my view, the answer is no. Article 12(2) is a rights clause. It raises individual rights, including those of the accused, to constitutional rank, but gives the courts no power to criminalize. Using it to import such a definition against the accused turns a guarantee into a source of liability. This reading also sits uneasily with the legality principle in Article 15 ICCPR, a right Article 12(2) itself incorporates. Nor does Article 49(2) fill the gap. It lifts the bar on retroactive legislation, but Syria has yet to enact a law defining these crimes. The sounder course would have been to convict on the national offenses, which carry their own penalties, and treat the international characterization as a contextual finding, pending legislation. At a minimum, the judgment must explain how these definitions entered Syrian law.

A Court in Question, a Judgment Unpublished

A ministerial decision, rather than legislation, appears to have designated the chamber hearing these cases, yet Article 44 of the Declaration and Article 14(1) ICCPR both require courts to be established by law. The Court has not publicly addressed this tension.

The record is also thin. The indictment is unpublished, and the 396-page judgment announced on August 11 remains inaccessible, although the Court promised its release after redacting protected witnesses’ names. At the hearings, the prosecution relied mainly on witnesses, though the indictment and oral summary cited documentary, medical, and audiovisual evidence. Articles 310(1) and 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) require courts to give reasons for criminal judgments and to pronounce them in open court, but impose no general duty to publish them. The only exception is the summary of an in absentia judgment, which Article 329 CCP requires the Public Prosecutor to publish in the Official Gazette and a local newspaper within eight days. Under Article 330 CCP, authorities can enforce the judgment only from the day after the summary appears in the Gazette. No such summary has appeared for the seven absent defendants. In practice, Syrian trial judgments rarely appear in print, so withholding this one is not unusual, but the weight of this case makes that practice inadequate.

According to the Justice Minister, Najib has thirty days to appeal. If that period runs out before counsel receives the reasoned judgment, a serious issue arises under Article 14(5) ICCPR: counsel cannot challenge facts, standards of proof, or reasoning they have not seen. Non-publication does not prove the defense lacks the judgment, but no one outside the proceedings can verify whether an effective appeal is possible. It also prevents a foreign court or international mechanism from assessing what the Syrian proceedings established.

In Absentia Rulings Need Notice and Counsel

Trials in absentia can be lawful, but authorities must prove proper notification, not presume it from absence. Article 14 ICCPR requires them to show that they took the necessary steps to summon and notify the accused. Bashar al-Assad has resided in Russia since December 2024, and posting the order to appear at his last residence in Syria, as Article 323 CCP prescribes, falls short of this standard. A record of the channels tried, and why each failed, would allow others to verify whether notice was proper. No such record is public.

No counsel represented the absent defendants. Article 325(1) CCP bars counsel from appearing for an absent accused, even though the right to legal representation persists in the defendant’s absence. Without counsel, the prosecution’s case goes untested. This gap matters all the more because the Court relied, at least in part, on command responsibility, a mode of liability that Syrian law does not regulate but customary international law recognizes. Its elements – effective control, knowledge, and necessary and reasonable measures – especially need adversarial scrutiny.

This combined absence of the accused and counsel limits the judgment’s uses. Article 333 CCP offers a strong safeguard that also makes the judgment provisional: if the accused surrenders or is arrested before the penalty becomes time-barred, the law automatically annuls the judgment, and the court retries the case. Presenting it as final and irrevocable would overstate what it settles.

Death Sentences Require a Clear Legal Basis

Syria has never joined the ICCPR’s Second Optional Protocol, so it may lawfully retain the death penalty. Article 6(2) ICCPR, however, confines capital punishment to the “most serious crimes,” which General Comment No. 36 of the Human Rights Committee reads narrowly as extremely grave crimes involving intentional killing. Convictions for intentional killing could, in principle, qualify.

Published reports indicate that the homicide charges rest on Articles 534 and 535 Penal Code. Article 535 prescribes death for premeditated murder, so a national basis exists. But published reports list them alongside Articles 216 and 556 Penal Code and the 2022 Anti-Torture Law, without identifying which provision carries the death sentence. The judgment must identify the crime and the provision that authorized the death penalty when the conduct occurred, since an international characterization cannot supply a penalty national law did not then prescribe.

Two practical considerations also arise. First, death sentences can complicate extradition and mutual legal assistance with abolitionist states, which may demand assurances against execution. Second, executing Najib would end any chance of learning what he knows about Daraa’s security agencies and the fate of those they detained.

Verdicts Need Reasons

The Hassoun verdict suggests that the Court can distinguish between cases. It rejected the prosecution’s request for the death penalty and addressed Hassoun’s public rhetoric using Article 298 Penal Code. Read with Article 216 Penal Code, Article 298 punishes an assault aimed at inciting civil war or sectarian strife. Without the reasoned judgments, no one can yet say whether the Court reasoned more rigorously than in Case No. 1. Still, the verdict indicates that the difficulties discussed here are not inherent to the Court.

The August rulings show Syria reaching judicial outcomes faster than it is building the legal framework to sustain them. The courts can close some gaps themselves by publishing reasoned judgments and the notification record. Others need legislation: codifying international crimes, allowing counsel for absent defendants, protecting witnesses, and giving the chamber a clear statutory basis.

These corrections are not about satisfying external opinion. Appellate review at home, evidence in European courts, or the eventual arrest of those now in Moscow – every such use of these verdicts depends on a record others can examine. With that record, these trials can become what the families of the detained and the disappeared have waited more than a decade for: a reckoning grounded in proof, not power. The value of these verdicts will depend less on who was convicted than on whether the Syrian judiciary can show why.

Source: Völkerrechtsblog
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Fadel Abdul Ghany

Fadel Abdulghany

Founder and Head of the Syrian Network for Human Rights from June 2011 to date.

Master’s in International Law (LLM)/ De Montfort University/ Leicester, UK (March 2020).

Bachelorette in Civil Engineering /Projects Management / Damascus University.

Recent Posts

  • A Verdict with No Public Record
  • The Great Plunder: What to Do with the Confiscated Millions of Assad?
  • The Abolition of the Immunity of Administrative Decisions in Syria: Restoring the Judiciary between Authority and Right

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