Fadel Abdulghany
On October 15, 2026, the Syrian authorities announced the arrest of Mihraç Ural, known as Ali Kayyali, who led the pro-Assad regime militia “the Syrian Resistance.” The accusations of his involvement in the two massacres of the village of al-Bayda and the neighborhood of Ras al-Nabaa in the city of Baniyas date back to May 2013. On the tenth of that month, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) issued a report in which it named Ural as one of the leaders of the two massacres, based on the testimonies of local residents.
More than thirteen years later, one of the individuals named in that report, which was prepared only days after the crimes took place, is now in custody. As for national judicial accountability for such crimes, it was impossible under the rule of Assad.
Today, the arrest of Ural raises a fundamental question for the path of transitional justice: can evidence that was collected and preserved at a time where the state itself was complicit in the perpetration of atrocities form the basis for credible prosecutions under a new authority? The answer depends on two essential conditions: the establishment of individual criminal responsibility, and the guarantee of the independence of the institutions charged with investigation and adjudication.
On May 2, 2013, the forces of the Assad regime and allied armed groups encircled the village of al-Bayda and shelled it before storming it. Residents were shot dead, others were summarily executed, some of them with knives and other bladed weapons, homes and bodies were burned, and entire families were wiped out. On the following day, the killings extended to the neighborhood of Ras al-Nabaa. We at SNHR documented the killing of 459 civilians, 264 of them in al-Bayda and 195 in Ras al-Nabaa; among the victims were 92 children and 71 women. We also recorded the names of 40 individuals who were abducted, while the fate of others remained unknown.
We collected the testimonies on which the report is built under conditions where the area was besieged, and the witnesses faced the risk of reprisal if they gave their testimonies. Our team was not able to access the crime scenes; therefore, we relied on the accounts of survivors, eyewitnesses, the families of the victims, and local activists, and we cross-referenced them with photographs and video recordings in order to verify their accuracy. The value of this record lies in the fact that it is contemporaneous with the events, as it was prepared many years before the fall of the regime.
This highlights the fundamental difference between the documentation of atrocities and judicial conviction. Human rights investigations reveal patterns of violations and identify the forces involved in them; as for criminal courts, they must prove the acts attributed to each accused individually. A leadership position or influence within an armed group is not, on its own, sufficient for a conviction. Thus, the investigators must determine whether Ural directly participated in the commission of the crimes, ordered their commission, contributed to planning them, or knowingly provided assistance that meets the requirements of criminal responsibility under the applicable law.
The Syrian Ministry of Interior had announced, on October 4, 2026, the arrest of Jamal Trabulsi, whom it describes as having been the deputy of Ural. However, an organizational link between two individuals does not necessarily mean that both bear responsibility for the same crimes. Hence, the investigations should be built on evidence, not on organizational links, and should extend to everyone whom the evidence links to the two massacres, including former military and security officials.
These killings may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity. However, such a characterization in human rights reports does not settle the legal basis of the prosecution. The Syrian Public Prosecution must determine the legal provision on which it relies for each crime, for each mode of individual criminal responsibility, and for each potential penalty. These choices will also affect the prospects for international judicial cooperation. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria is able to support competent judicial authorities with evidence and analysis; however, this support is limited to cases in which the death penalty cannot be imposed.
The Turkish Public Prosecutor’s Office also accuses Ural of involvement in planning the two Reyhanlı bombings of May 11, 2013, which killed 53 people. According to Turkish media reports, the 9th High Criminal Court of Ankara, on June 5, 2026, convicted three other defendants in the case, and severed the case of Ural because he remained at large.
This parallel prosecution raises the question of jurisdiction and of the priority of trial, which calls for a coordination between the two countries that ensures that the proceedings do not conflict, and that does not prejudice the right of the victims of Baniyas to a trial before the Syrian judiciary.
A trial alone is not sufficient to meet the needs of the families of the victims. These families need to know the fate of their missing relatives, to obtain acknowledgment of what their loved ones were subjected to, and to be guaranteed effective avenues of reparation. This requires enabling them to access information, providing them with genuine opportunities to participate in the judicial proceedings, and protecting them against reprisals. Likewise, the information of witnesses that was collected in 2013 must be handled in accordance with safeguards that protect confidentiality, ensure informed consent, and preserve the rights of the defense.
Ural enjoys the presumption of innocence, the right to legal counsel, protection against coercion, and the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. Criminal responsibility is individual; therefore, accountability for the crimes of the Assad era must not turn into holding entire communities responsible for those crimes on the basis of sect, origin, or family affiliation.
The arrest of Ural does not end impunity in Syria, but it places the Syrian institutions before a real test: are they able to transform the evidence that was preserved under the repression of Assad into judgments issued by independent courts, within proceedings that respect the guarantees of a fair trial and that contribute to revealing the fate of the missing and to providing redress for the victims? The outcome of this case, whether success or failure, will determine the extent of the trust of Syrians in the path of transitional justice.
We documented the testimonies of the survivors in 2013 in order to preserve the truth, at a time where justice seemed out of reach; today, it falls upon the state to prove that those testimonies were not collected in vain, and that the truth which was preserved can be transformed into justice.
