Fadel Abdulghany
The Syrian People’s Assembly approved, on November 9, 2026, a draft law that repeals all provisions that bar the right to litigation or immunize any administrative act or decision from the review of the competent judiciary, wherever they appear in the legislation in force.
The draft has not yet become an enforceable law, as this depends on its promulgation by the President of the Republic in accordance with Article 39 of the Constitutional Declaration and then its publication in the Official Gazette; moreover, neither its final text nor its transitional provisions have been made known. This article is an attempt to analyze what has been announced: the return of the judiciary to its position between the administrative authority and the right of the individual, so that the administrative decision is subject to the judicial review of legality, rather than being immunized from it by a legislative provision. However, this change does not automatically translate into effective judicial protection, nor into redress for past grievances; both depend on the legal rules, the judicial institutions, and the available remedies.
Legislative immunization does not establish that the decision is lawful; rather, it prevents the legality of that decision from being subjected to review by an independent body. Thus, the assessment by the administration of the limits of its own jurisdiction in the immunized decision becomes final as against whoever is affected by it, and the administration, within this scope, combines the capacities of both party and judge. The lifting of immunization, however, does not make the judge a substitute for the administration in assessing expediency, as the review of the judge is directed at legality: jurisdiction, procedures, conformity with the law, and the purpose for which the power is exercised.
Nor does the draft create the guarantee out of nothing. Article 17(2) of the Constitutional Declaration issued on March 13, 2025, safeguards the right to litigation, the right of defense, and the pursuit of avenues of appeal, and prohibits laws from including provisions that immunize any administrative act or decision from judicial review. However, Article 51 keeps the laws in force in effect until they are amended or repealed, and without an explicit repeal, the continued application of the old immunization provisions remains a matter of constitutional and judicial dispute. The legislative repeal removes this obstacle, and reduces the need for disputes over each provision separately. As for the phrase “barring the right to litigation,” which is broader than administrative immunization, it does not abolish every procedural requirement; the criterion is whether the restriction regulates the exercise of the right or prevents it.
The removal of the bar to hearing the case does not mean the annulment of the decision, nor the establishment of the liability of the one who issued it, nor an entitlement to compensation. Administrative justice already exists pursuant to the State Council Law No. 32 of 2019, and appeals will remain subject to the requirements of admissibility, the time limits, and the rules on the stay of execution. In the Expropriation Law issued by Legislative Decree No. 20 of 1983, a distinction should be drawn between two types of provisions: Article 7 makes the expropriation decree final, not subject to any form of appeal or review, and Article 24 likewise makes the decisions of the Valuation Review Committee final; these are two explicit immunization provisions. As for Article 25, it defines the content of the right, not the means of claiming it: it prohibits the revaluation of the compensation when its payment is delayed, providing only for the legal interest, and makes this interest preclusive of any other compensation arising from the expropriation decree, the registration of its annotation, or the taking of possession, including the fair rental value. It is not yet clear whether the courts will consider these provisions restrictions that bar the right to litigation and are thus covered by the repeal, or substantive rules to be applied after the case is admitted. The same applies to decisions of dismissal from employment, as the appeal allows the decision to be examined but does not automatically reinstate the employee, since that depends on the outcome of the case and the effects of the judgment. Articles 123 and 124 of the State Council Law provide facilitations for cases arising from the employment relationship, including the exemption from fees and deposits, the possibility of personal appearance before the courts, and the exemption from the prior administrative grievance; the question, therefore, is the extent of their application and their sufficiency, not an assumption of their absence.
Formal access to the court does not equal effective judicial protection. Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Syria acceded in 1969, obliges the State to ensure an effective remedy for any person whose rights guaranteed by the Covenant have been violated, and to enforce such remedies when granted. A judgment that the administration is able to ignore restores the old relationship with other tools. Therefore, the reform is tested in the independence of the judge, the access of the litigant to the administrative file, and the compliance of public bodies with judgments; these are guarantees that the State Council Law regulates in part, but their effectiveness is measured by practice.
The most difficult issue appears in the temporal scope. The Chairman of the Constitutional and Legislative Committee in the People’s Assembly stated that the law “does not apply retroactively to decisions prior to its entry into force, but rather covers the decisions and acts issued after it enters into force.” This is a statement that indicates the declared direction; however, it is not equivalent to a binding text, nor does it settle the judicial application. The question comprises three different matters: the immediate application of the new law; the retroactive effect that alters legal positions formed in the past; and the reopening of time limits that have expired or of judgments that have acquired the force of res judicata. Even if the abolition of immunization allows an old dispute to be brought before the judge, it will not, in principle, change the substantive standards by which the legality of the decision is examined as at the time of its issuance. However, this does not settle whether the case may be heard, as Article 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure No. 1 of 2016, which the State Council Law permits to be applied where it contains no provision, restricts, in specific cases, the immediate application of laws amending jurisdiction, time limits, and methods of appeal; thus, its applicability here depends on the legal characterization of the repeal: is it a procedural amendment, or the removal of a legislative bar that prevented the avenue of appeal from arising in the first place?
Nor is it correct to place prior decisions in a single category. A decision for which the time limit for appeal is still running differs from a decision whose time limit has expired, and a case that was dismissed because of the immunization provision differs from a case that was decided on its merits, even though each judgment retains its res judicata effect within the limits of what it decided. Legal stability protects settled positions and the rights of bona fide third parties; however, its argument weakens when the bar is a legislative provision that closed access to the judiciary, or when detention, displacement, or the loss of documents prevented the claim. The legislator may regulate these cases by transitional provisions, but its choice is constrained by the guarantees of litigation and property on the one hand, and by the res judicata of judgments and the rights of third parties on the other; and the provision most capable of reconciling them is one that defines the categories of decisions covered and sets a special time limit for appeal, rather than leaving the matter to interpretations that may diverge between courts. Until this becomes clear, the capacity of the reform to address past grievances remains unsettled, while the other existing remedies remain available according to the nature of each dispute.
Thus, the constitutional rule that subjects the administration to the judiciary has been in place since March 2025, and what the draft adds is the removal of the provisions that prevented its implementation, that is, the transfer of the prohibition from the level of principle to the structure of legislation. The value of this addition will be measured by what follows it: a final text that explicitly addresses prior decisions; executive instructions that do not reintroduce the restrictions in a procedural form, particularly given that the Constitutional Declaration, in Article 44, referred the determination of the jurisdictions of the courts to the law; and an independent judiciary with whose judgments the administration complies. The removal of immunization returns the administration to the position of one who is held accountable for the legality of its decision; as for turning this into actual protection of rights and redress for those who were deprived of recourse to the judiciary in the past, it depends on what is built around the text, not on the text alone.






