Fadel Abdulghany
On August 11, 2026, the Fourth Criminal Court for Transitional Justice Cases in Damascus issued, under Decision No. 1 of 2026, death sentences in absentia against Bashar al-Assad, Maher al-Assad, and a number of other fugitive former officials.
According to what was published by the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the decision provided for maintaining the arrest warrants issued against the defendants who remain at large, and directed the competent authorities to pursue international cooperation procedures in order to apprehend them. On October 22, the President of the Court, Judge Fakhreddin al-Aryan, stated, as reported by SANA, that the judgments issued in absentia are being transmitted to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). These judgments demonstrate the willingness of the Syrian courts to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over the former leaders of the country; however, whether they can serve as a basis for activating an effective international cooperation remains a separate question. A state can prosecute crimes falling within its jurisdiction, but it cannot enforce its judicial orders on the territory of another state without the cooperation of that state. INTERPOL facilitates this cooperation; however, it does not remove the legal constraints that govern it. Moreover, the ability of other states to cooperate, and the extent of their willingness to do so, depend to a large degree on the credibility of the Syrian judicial proceedings.
The October statement indicates that the Syrian authorities are seeking to activate international police cooperation; however, it does not include a reference number for any request or its date of registration, nor does it confirm that INTERPOL has accepted a request or issued a Red Notice. As for the judgment itself, the only information available about it is what SANA published in its official account. INTERPOL does not necessarily require the submission of the full text of the judgment in order to issue a Red Notice; however, its unavailability limits the possibility of an independent scrutiny of the findings reached by the court. Furthermore, foreign authorities examining extradition requests may need more detailed judicial documents and evidence.
Even if the request is accepted, its legal effects remain limited, since cooperation passes through a chain of independent decisions. First, the Syrian authorities must submit a request that meets the legal requirements; then, INTERPOL assesses whether the issuance of a Red Notice complies with its Constitution and its Rules on the Processing of Data. If the notice is issued, the state in whose territory the wanted person is located decides, in accordance with its national law, whether to arrest that person. As for extradition, it requires further proceedings governed by the law of that state and by any applicable treaty. None of these stages leads automatically to the next. A Red Notice is a request to law enforcement agencies worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest the wanted person pending extradition, surrender, or a similar legal action; it is not, in itself, an arrest warrant. Thus, INTERPOL does not have the authority to compel any state to arrest the subject of a Red Notice.
The assessment of INTERPOL is not a mere formality, since its Constitution contains two essential safeguards. Article 2 requires that cooperation be conducted in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which makes respect for human rights an independent consideration in its own right. As for Article 3, it strictly forbids the Organization from undertaking any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character. In practice, INTERPOL applies the test of predominance, which examines whether the criminal nature of the acts attributed to the person predominates over their political or military dimensions. Having held a former official position does not, in itself, constitute a bar to cooperation; the principle of political neutrality does not mean immunity from criminal accountability, but rather aims to prevent the use of police cooperation as a tool of political persecution. Therefore, the question here is whether the request concerns specific criminal acts and satisfies the safeguards adopted by the Organization. In addition, Article 83 of the INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data requires sufficient judicial data, including a summary of the facts, the charges brought against the person, the applicable law, and a reference to a valid arrest warrant or a judicial decision having the same effect. Where the charges relate to the ordering of crimes or to command responsibility, the request must set out the acts attributed to the person concerned and their link to the crimes being prosecuted. As for determining whether the evidence establishes this form of liability, it remains a matter for the trial court, not for INTERPOL.
The legal nature of the judgments issued affects the subsequent proceedings. According to the published operative part of the judgments and the statement of the President of the Court in October, the arrest of a person convicted in absentia, or the voluntary surrender of that person, results in the lapse of the judgment in absentia and a retrial. This prevents the enforcement of the sentences imposed under the existing judgments in their current form, and any request for cooperation should state this consequence explicitly. Hence, it is the retrial that must meet the guarantees of a fair trial: Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires that the trial be conducted before a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, with respect for the presumption of innocence, a guarantee of the right to an effective defense, an opportunity to examine and challenge the evidence, and a guarantee of the right to have the conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. However, a retrial does not exclude the possibility of a new death sentence.
This possibility is among the most prominent obstacles facing the extradition of wanted persons. Syria acceded to the ICCPR in 1969; however, it has not acceded to its Second Optional Protocol, and therefore it is not bound under that Protocol to abolish the death penalty. Nevertheless, Article 6 of the Covenant restricts, in countries that have not abolished the death penalty, the imposition of this penalty to the most serious crimes.
The impact of sentencing decisions is not limited to the extradition of wanted persons; rather, it extends to other forms of international assistance. The International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) for Syria, which collects, preserves, and analyzes evidence and prepares case files, provides support to judicial authorities that respect fair trial standards, on the condition that the death penalty is not applicable. The approach of this Mechanism differs from that of INTERPOL, which does not apply a similar categorical rule regarding the death penalty. This comparison shows that national choices regarding judicial proceedings and penalties may determine the extent of the international support that Syrian criminal prosecutions can obtain.
None of the above means that the Syrian prosecution turns into an international criminal prosecution. When Syria requests the assistance of INTERPOL, it seeks to obtain the cooperation of other states in order to enable a national court to exercise its jurisdiction. The assessment by INTERPOL of whether the request complies with its rules does not constitute a ruling on the guilt of the wanted person, nor does the issuance of a Red Notice constitute a certification of the fairness of any subsequent trial. The credibility of the judicial proceedings depends on the Syrian institutions themselves, on the publication of reasoned judgments, on allowing an independent monitoring of trials, on ensuring equality of arms between the prosecution and the defense, and on the adoption of a prosecutorial strategy that traces the evidence up the chain of command. The August decision preserved the right of the Public Prosecution to pursue other officials, as well as persons who contributed to or participated in the commission of the crimes, in separate proceedings. Each request relating to such persons will be subject to an independent assessment based on its own circumstances, and will require its own evidentiary basis.
The announcement of the referral of the judicial decisions to INTERPOL reflects the endeavor of the Syrian authorities to extend criminal prosecution beyond the borders of the country. A Red Notice, if issued, may help locate the wanted person, and may lead to their provisional arrest. INTERPOL can circulate information about a person wanted under a Syrian judicial order; however, it cannot make that order enforceable in another state. The powers of arrest, extradition, and prosecution remain distributed among the national institutions of each state, each of which is subject to its own laws and its human rights obligations. Thus, the national judicial track does not acquire its legitimacy merely by obtaining international cooperation; rather, the prospects for such cooperation depend on the soundness of the Syrian judicial proceedings and their compliance with international legal standards, as well as on the obligations incumbent upon the states from which cooperation is requested.
